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Abstract: In recent years, wireless sensor networks (WSNs) have been considered as a 
potential solution for real-time monitoring applications and these WSNs have potential 
practical  impact  on  next  generation  technology  too.  However,  WSNs  could  become  a 
threat if suitable security is not considered before the deployment and if there are any 
loopholes in their security, which might open the door for an attacker and hence, endanger 
the  application.  User  authentication  is  one  of  the  most  important  security  services  to 
protect  WSN  data  access  from  unauthorized  users;  it  should  provide  both  mutual 
authentication and session key establishment services. This paper proposes a robust user 
authentication framework for wireless sensor networks, based on a two-factor (password 
and smart card) concept. This scheme facilitates many services to the users such as user 
anonymity, mutual authentication, secure session key establishment and it allows users to 
choose/update their password regularly, whenever needed. Furthermore, we have provided 
the  formal  verification  using  Rubin  logic  and  compare  RUASN  with  many  existing 
schemes.  As  a  result,  we  found  that  the  proposed  scheme  possesses  many  advantages 
against popular attacks, and achieves better efficiency at low computation cost. 
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1. Introduction  
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are becoming more and more popular in everyday life as they 
offer economically viable, real time monitoring solutions. These wireless sensors can be quickly and 
easily deployed in hostile environments, and WSNs are now widely used in a variety of real-time 
applications, such as vehicular tracking, habitat monitoring, environment control, military surveillance, 
healthcare monitoring, wildlife monitoring and traffic monitoring. One recent survey declared that, in 
the near future, WSNs will become an intelligent and integral part of daily lives [1]. 
A  WSN  consists  of  a  discrete  group  of  independent,  low  cost,  low  power  nodes  with  limited 
memory  and  computation  power.  They  communicate  wirelessly  over  limited  frequency  and  low 
bandwidth [1]. More specifically, sensor nodes collectively monitor the area and sense substantial 
amounts of data, which are transmitted to the base-station traversing some nodes via RF signals and 
routing schemes. 
As sensor nodes are resource constrained devices and are often deployed in a hostile environment and 
have to sense the information properly and efficiently. So the potential deployment of WSNs for any  
real-time  applications  has  to  deal  with  many  challenges,  including  security,  system  architecture  and 
protocol functionalities. Providing security to these resource hungry sensor networks is a very tedious task 
as  compared  to  conventional  networks,  such  as  local  area  networks  (LANs)  and wide area networks 
(WANs). Consequently, providing suitable security has emerged as one of the critical issue in wireless 
sensor networks, and the state-of-art should therefore pay attention to how to deploy user-friendly, reliable 
and secure WSNs. 
In real-time WSNs, sensor data queries are commonly issued from the base-station nodes or the 
backend  application  system.  Moreover,  these  sensor  networks  can  be  accessed  from  anywhere  in  
an ad-hoc manner. As sensor nodes provide services to users by themselves, it is necessary to control 
who is accessing the information and whether the intended user is authenticated to do so. Therefore, 
access control is a core requirement for WSNs to protect the data from access by unauthorized parties. 
In general user authentication where each user must verify their legitimacy is considered as one of the 
basic solutions for the access control issue. 
So far, a number of significant schemes that provide adequate security for wireless sensor networks 
at  the  link  layer  [2-6]  and  the  network  layer  [7]  have  been  proposed.  However,  secure  user 
authentication at the application layer has not been addressed effectively in order to prevent illegal 
access  to  sensor  data.  A  review  of  current  literature  on  WSNs  reveals  that  only  a  few  user 
authentication  schemes  have  been  adequately  addressed  [8-22]  at  the  application  layer.  In  [8-14], 
protocols  are  based  on  traditional  passwords,  where  secrets  are  stored  at  the  base  station  or  the 
gateway. While, the protocols presented in [18-21] are based on two-factor user authentication with 
limited functionality (e.g., no mutual authentication, no secure session key, and no confidentiality) at 
high computation cost. Therefore, one of the primary concerns in wireless sensor network applications Sensors 2011, 11                                       
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is the design and development of a robust user authentication scheme which is suitable for hostile or 
unattended environments. 
In this paper, we have considered the above challenges and present a robust user authentication 
framework for wireless sensor networks (RUASN) at the application layer, which uses the two factor 
approach. The first factor (something you know) refers to something that is known by the user, such  
as a password, while the second factor (something you have) refers that something that is embedded  
on  a  device,  such  as  smart  cards,  software  tokens,  digital  certificates  or  biometric  identifiers  
(e.g., fingerprint scans and so on) [23].  
The proposed RUASN framework achieves user authentication (access control) for wireless sensor 
networks, where a user must login with same identity. The proposed scheme is resists many popular 
attacks,  such  as  replay  attack,  impersonation  attack,  insider  attack,  stolen-verifier  attack,  password 
guessing  attack,  and  man-in-the-middle  attack.  RUASN  provides  user  privacy  protection  (i.e.,  user 
anonymity), mutual authentication, and secure session key establishment. In addition, a user can update 
his/her password whenever demanded. Our framework uses one-way hash functions along with XOR 
operations to attain low computational overheads. Moreover, this paper further demonstrated the analysis 
and  verification  of  the  proposed  protocol  using  Rubin  Logic  [24],  which  is  very  close  to  actual 
implementation. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 briefly reviews the related literature and the 
perceived  weaknesses  of  existing  schemes.  In  Section  3  we  discuss  the  design  goals,  security 
requirements and system architecture of RUASN. In Section 4, we propose a robust two-factor user 
authentication framework in detail. Section 5 discusses the nonmonotonic cryptographic protocol and 
formal verification of proposed protocol using Rubin Logic. Section 6 discusses the security analysis, 
efficiency evaluation and comparison with existing schemes for wireless sensor networks. Finally, 
Section 7 conclusions are drawn for RUASN.  
2. Literature Review 
In this section, we will discuss the literature on user authentication schemes that have been recently 
proposed to verify the legitimacy of wireless sensor networks users.  
Benenson et al. [8] first described several security issues in WSNs, especially the access control 
problem, and proposed the notion of n-authentication, where users can successfully authenticate with 
at least (n-t) of n-sensors, where t is the number of sensor nodes that the adversary can compromise. 
Subsequently, Benenson et al. [9] proposed another solution for the user authentication problem in the 
face of node capture attacks. The proposed scheme is based on public key cryptography (PKC) and 
elliptic curve cryptography (ECC). Some major weaknesses were pointed out in the Benenson et al. 
scheme,  such  as  the  fact  that  impersonation  attacks  or  denial-of-service  (DoS)  attacks  could  be 
mounted  by  sending  many  bogus  signatures  during  the  authentication  phase  [10].  Moreover,  the 
computation cost of PKC and ECC is very high for sensor networks.  
Wong et al. [10] proposed a dynamic user authentication scheme for wireless sensor networks, 
which is based on passwords. This scheme imposes a very light computation cost that requires only 
one-way  hash  functions  and  simple  XOR  operations.  The  scheme  consists  of  three  phases: 
registration  phase,  login  and  authentication  phase.  Unfortunately,  the  Wong  et  al.  scheme  is Sensors 2011, 11                                       
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vulnerable  to  many  attacks  such  as  replay  attacks,  forgery  attacks,  stolen-verifier  attacks  and 
password guessing attacks [11,12,14,18].  
Vaidya et al. [14] pointed out some weaknesses of the Tseng et al. [11], Wong et al. [10] and Ko [14] 
schemes such as replay of account-login attacks, man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks, forgery attacks and 
stolen-verifier attack with node capture attacks. They proposed two user authentication schemes for 
wireless  sensor  networks,  which  are  based  on  traditional  password  schemes  and  claimed  that  their 
proposed scheme provides better security features as compared to the Wong et al., Tseng et al. and  
Ko et al. schemes.  
Recently, Das [18] pointed out some security flaws in Wong et al. [10] scheme, such as the fact this 
scheme is vulnerable to many logged in users with the same login-id threat and also susceptible to 
stolen-verifier  attacks.  Das  [18]  proposed  a  two-factor  user  authentication  for  wireless  sensor 
networks, where the legitimate users must prove the possession of both a password and a smart card. 
Das [18] claimed that his scheme is secure against many types of attacks (e.g., user authentication, 
replay, guessing, impersonation, node compromise, and stolen-verifier attacks). 
Nyang and Lee [19] noted that Das’ scheme is not practical and is vulnerable to an offline password 
guessing attack by insiders, node compromise attacks and does not care about other security issues, 
i.e.,  encryption  and  authenticity  verification  of  query  responses.  Consequently  they  proposed  an 
enhanced  two-factor  user  authentication  protocol  for  WSNs,  which  overcome  the  Das  scheme’s 
security flaws with some additional security services such as confidentiality and authenticity of user 
query responses. However, their scheme also does not care about mutual authentication and there is no 
provision for password updates. 
Khan and Alghathbar [20] pointed out that the Das et al. [18] scheme is still not secure and cannot 
resist many other security attacks, such as gateway-node bypass attacks, and it is vulnerable to insider 
attacks, as well as not facilitating mutual authentication between the gateway and the sensor nodes and 
there is no provision for users to change their passwords. Khan and Alghathbar [20] overcome the 
security  weaknesses  of  Das’  scheme  and  proposed  an  improved  two-factor  user  authentication  in 
WSNs, which provides protection against insider attacks, gateway bypass attacks and introduced a 
password change phase for users. They suggested two secret (Xa and Xs) values to be used to overcome 
the gateway-bypass attacks. For example, Xa is used between the user and the gateway, and Xs is used 
between the gateway and the sensor nodes. Furthermore, to overcome the room for insider attack, they 
passed hashed passwords instead of plain passwords. Their scheme also does not however provide 
mutual authentication between the user and the gateway.  
More  recently,  He  et  al.  [21]  have  shown  that  Das’  protocol  is  susceptible  to  insider  attacks, 
impersonation attacks and also found design weaknesses (i.e., concerning real identity of user). Later, 
they  proposed  an  enhanced  two-factor  user  authentication  scheme  for  WSNs  that  facilitates  user 
anonymity, protection against insider attacks and allows users to change their passwords. Their scheme 
does not care about mutual authentication between all parties (i.e., user, gateway and sensor). Moreover, 
the communication cost is quite high as compared with other schemes (see [10-14,18-20]).  
As we have seen above, a number of user authentication schemes have been proposed in order to 
authenticate user legitimacy for sensor networks. These schemes are not designed properly [10-14]  
(i.e., stored secrets at the gateway) and in [18-21] they do not provide essential services to the users. 
Consequently, we conclude that the above schemes have many security flaws and provide less security Sensors 2011, 11                                       
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services. Thus, these security weaknesses and constrained nature of sensor nodes motivated us to 
design a robust user authentication framework that provides adequate security and provides users with 
many services, as discussed in the next section. 
3. Design Goals, Security Requirements and System Architecture 
In this section, we discuss the design goals, security requirements and system architecture for robust 
user authentication for wireless sensor networks. 
3.1. Design Goals and Security Requirements 
RUASN provides transparent security service for wireless sensor networks. In this paper another 
goal is to design a simple and user-friendly framework, which will be suitable for real-time WSNs 
applications. Overall, RUASN is designed with the following characteristics: 
Proper user authentication: A user must prove his/her authenticity, so that only authentic users can 
access the WSN data. 
Mutual authentication: Every entity (user, gateway and sensor) must be mutually authenticated; 
hence they can ensure the communication is only taking place between authentic entities. 
User anonymity: Since all the messages are broadcasted wirelessly, which means that an attacker 
may simply eavesdrop on the messages and could breach the privacy of a user, thus, the scheme 
must provide user anonymity.  
Session key establishment: A session key should be established between a user and sensor node, so 
that subsequent communication could take place securely. 
Confidentiality:  It  is  desirable  that  a  user  authentication  protocol  facilitate  confidentiality  of 
messages; as a result, these confidential messages can only be used by authorized users.  
Password update: A password based user authentication scheme should provide users a password 
update facility so that a user can update his/her password freely. 
Low communication and computational cost: Since sensor nodes are resource constrained devices 
(e.g.,  MicaZ  [25],  and  Telosb  [26])  and,  in  general,  application  functions  also  need  room  for 
executing  their  tasks.  So,  the  scheme  must  be  efficient  in  terms  of  communication  and 
computational cost. 
Robust  against  popular  attacks:  Clearly,  the  scheme  should  defend  against  different  popular 
attacks, such as replay, impersonation, insider, stolen-verifier, password guessing, and man-in-the-
middle attacks. As a result, the scheme should be easily applicable to real-world applications. 
User-Friendliness: The system architecture should be easy to deploy for the WSN applications as 
well  as  user-friendly  for  non-advanced  users  so  users  can  update  his/her  password  securely 
according to their will. 
Reliability: From the security point of view, the gateway needs to check the validity of the users 
and the sensor nodes, so that reliable communication can be established between all the parties. Sensors 2011, 11                                       
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Moreover,  Liao  et  al.  [27]  identified  some  security  requirements  to  evaluate  a  smart  card  and 
password based authentication protocol. Their requirements solve most of the problems in smart card 
oriented schemes. As sensor networks are resource constrained devices, WSN could adopt Liao et al. 
requirements, which are listed below: 
  The password tables should not be stored inside the gateway. 
  Verification table should not be stored inside the gateway. 
  The password should not be transmitted as plain text over the public network. 
  Schemes should resist insider-attacks. 
  Password length should be sufficient. 
  The password is not exposed by the gateway administrator.  
  Scheme should resist offline password guessing attacks. 
3.2. System Architecture 
Wireless sensor networks consist of a number N of low-cost sensor devices, which are scattered in a 
hostile environment. These sensors sense the environmental information, (e.g., humidity, pressure, and 
temperature) and transmit information to the users for further analysis. A user can access real-time 
WSN  data  using  their  mobile  devices  (e.g.,  laptop,  PDA  or  smart-phone)  through  wireless 
communication. WSN data could be easily accessible from anywhere in ad-hoc manner. In real-time 
environment it is obvious that the gateway nodes and the users are able to access the sensor data 
directly. The basic system architecture is shown in Figure 1, where a user directly request to the sensor 
node, upon receiving user request sensor node first verify user authenticity through the gateway node.  
Figure 1. The basic system architecture for RUASN. 
 Sensors 2011, 11                                       
 
 
5026 
After  confirmation  of  the  user’s  legitimacy  he/she  can  access  the  real-time  sensor  data. 
Furthermore, the gateway node provides a middle ground between the users and the sensor network. 
 
4. RUASN: Robust User Authentication for Wireless Sensor Network 
To  solve  the  potential  problems  of  user  authentication  for  WSNs,  we  propose  RUASN  which 
ensures WSN data are only accessed by legitimate users. Thus, before issuing a query to a sensor node, 
each user must register with the gateway in a secure manner so that they can access the real time 
sensors’ data. Upon the successful user registration request, the gateway node personalizes a smart 
card for every registered user, as shown in Figure 1. Then, a user can submit his/her query in an 
authentic way and access the sensor network data at any time within an administratively configurable 
period [10].  
In order to execute the proposed framework, we considered that the gateway is a trusted node and it 
hold two master keys (x and y), which are sufficiently large for the sensor network. Before starting the 
system, it is assumed that the gateway and the sensor nodes share a long-term common secret key, i.e.,  
SKgs = h(Sn||y) using any key agreement protocol. For example, [4] demonstrated that, with the careful 
design,  D-H  key  agreement  protocol  [28]  and  RSA  public  key  cryptosystem  [29]  can  be  easily 
deployed on most constrained devices. Here, h(.) is a collision free one-way hash function (i.e., SHA-
1), which has an output length of 160-bits [30] and is used throughout this paper. It is assumed that 
some identical secure symmetric cryptosystems are publically available and stored on the user device, 
on the gateway and the sensor node. As a result only the users registered with the gateway have access 
privileges to the sensors, which share a long-term secret with the gateway. The framework is divided 
into  four  phases,  namely,  user  registration  phase,  login  phase,  authentication  phase  and  password 
update phase. For convenience Table 1 provides a list of some notations and symbols will be used 
throughout the rest of paper. 
Table 1. Notation and symbols used in the paper. 
Notation  Descriptions 
GW node  WSN gateway node 
Uk  k
th User to be login 
IDk  Login_ID of Uk  
PWk  Password of Uk  
x and y   Gateway master keys 
r  Arbitrary random number selected by user 
l  Random number generated by the GW node 
Ekey [m]  Message m is encrypted with symmetric key  
Dkey [m]  Message m is decrypted with symmetric key  
MAC_key (m) [31]  Message authentication code over message m with secret key  
Sn  Sensor Node ID 
Xg  Secret parameter generated by the user Uk 
h(.)  Cryptographic hash function 
  Bitwise XOR operation 
||  Concatenation operation Sensors 2011, 11                                       
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4.1. Registration Phase (RP) 
In the registration phase, initially, each user must register with the GW node. A user Uk chooses 
his/her identity (IDk). Now user Uk chooses password (PWk) and selects an arbitrary random number r 
which should be sufficiently large and computes h(r  PWk). The IDk and PWk should include uppercase, 
lower case characters and 0–9 numeric characters [32]. Afterward, the user submits a registration request 
to  the  GW  node  over  a  secure  channel.  Upon  receiving  the  Uk  registration  request,  the  GW  node 
computes: 
1.  Ak=h(IDk l) 
2.  Bk= Ex[IDk||l] 
3.  Vk= h(IDk||h(rPWk)) 
Thereafter,  the  GW  node  personalizes  a  smart  card  for  the  user  with  the  parameters  
{Ak, Bk, Vk, h(.), Ek[.], Dk[.]}. Here, l is random number which is generated by the GW node and x is 
the gateway secret key and h(.) is a collision free one-way function, e.g., SHA-1 [30]. Subsequently, 
user Uk enters r into his/her smart card, by doing so, user Uk need not memorize the arbitrary random 
number.  Now  the  smart  card  contains  {Ak,  Bk,  Vk,  h(.),  Ek[.], Dk[.],  r}.  This  step  completes  the 
registration phase and the process flow is shown in Figure 2.  
Figure 2. Flow of registration phase. 
 
 
                                                                                                           
  Choose IDk, PWk and r 
  h(r PWk) 
                   IDk  & h(r PWk)                        
                                                            
  generate random number l 
  Ak = h(IDk l),and Bk = Ex[IDk||l] 
  Vk = h(IDk||h(rPWk))  
                            Gateway node personalized a smart 
card to user { Ak, Bk, Vk, h(.), Ek[.], Dk[.]}  
                                        {Smart card} 
 
Upon receiving the smart card, the user stores the random number r into the 
smart card; now smart card have {Ak,Bk, Vk, h(.), h(.), Ek[.], Dk[.], r}  
 
4.2. Login Phase (LP) 
This phase is invoked whenever a user Uk wants to submit his/her query to access the sensor, every 
time  he/she  has  to  complete  the  login  phase.  Figure  3  shows  both  the  login  phase  and  the 
authentication phase. The user Uk inserts his/her smart card into the terminal and inputs his IDk and 
PWk. 
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Figure 3. Flow of login and authentication phases. 
 
      
 
                                    
  Vk* = h(IDk||h(rPWk)) and verify Vk* = Vk, if not, then reject the login request. 
  Hk = h(Ak), and generate Xg 
  AIDk = ETkTu[h(IDk)||Sn||Xg],here, TkTu = (Tu||Hk) 
  M1= <Bk, AIDk, Tu> 
                                                                             
                                                                                          M1                              
                                                                                                                           
 
  (Ts − Tu) ≥ ∆T, if yes,  then abort                                                                                                                 
  M2 = <Bk, AIDk, Tu, Ts, Sn>, 
  Q = MAC_SKgs (Bk||AIDk|| Tu ||Ts||Sn).                                  
 
< M2, Q > 
                                                              
 
 (Tg − Ts) ≥ ∆T, if yes, then abort                                                                                                                                                                                                  
 Q′ = MAC_SKgs(M2) and verify Q′ = Q, if not, then abort 
 Obtain IDk′ and l′ from Bk 
 h(IDk′), Ak′ = h(IDk′ l′), and Hk′ = h(Ak′)  
 TkTu = ( Tu || Hk′) and  
 Obtains (h(IDk*)||Sn*||Xg ) from AIDk 
 Verify: h(IDk′) = h(IDk*) and Sn = Sn*, if not, then abort 
 M3 = <Tg, C>, here C = ESKgs[h(IDk)||Xg||Tg] 
                                                                                                                
                                                                                                                M3 
 
  (Ts − Tg) ≥ ∆T, if yes,  then abort                                                                                                                                                                                                  
  Obtains [h(IDk)||Xg||Tg*] from C 
  Verify: Tg = Tg*, if not, then abort 
  SesK = h(h(IDk)||Xg||Sn||Ts||Tu) 
  M4 = <L, Ts>, 
                                                                                                                  here L = ESesK[Xg||Ts] 
                                                                           M4                                                                                                        
 
  (Tu − Ts) ≥ ∆T, if yes, then abort   
  SesK = h(h(IDk)||Xg||Sn||Ts||Tu)  
  Obtains [Xg*||Ts*] from L 
  Verify: Xg = Xg* and Ts = Ts*, if not, then abort 
 
As a result, he/she believes that the sensor node Sn is authentic, otherwise not.  
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Now, the smart card performs the following operations: 
(LP-1). Compute: Vk* = h(IDk||h(rPWk)). 
(LP-2). Check whether Vk* and Vk are equal or not. If not, then reject the login request, otherwise, the 
user is a legal user and go to the next step.  
(LP-3). Compute: Hk = h(Ak). 
(LP-4). Compute: AIDk = ETkTu[h(IDk)||Sn||Xg]; here, TkTu = (Tu||Hk) is short-term key and Sn is the 
sensor node, which the user Uk wants to access. Here, Xg is a secret random number generated by the 
user Uk at login time, which is helpful to generate the session key between the user and the sensor node. 
Tu is denoting the current timestamp of Uk’s system, which resist replay attacks.  
(LP-5). Send the login message M1 = < Bk, AIDk, Tu > to the sensor node.  
Now, this is the end of login phase and the user login request message <M1> is send to the sensor 
node over a public channel. 
4.3. Authentication Phase (AP) 
The authentication phase is invoked when a sensor node receives the user login request message 
<M1> at time Ts. The sensor node authenticates users’ requests by the following steps: 
(AP-1). The sensor node, Sn validates the Tu: Check, if (Ts−Tu) ≥ ∆T, if yes, then Sn reject this 
request and terminates the process. Otherwise, it continues with the next step. Here, Ts is the current 
timestamp of Sn and ∆T is the defined time interval for the transmission delay. 
(AP-2). Now Sn generates message M2 = <Bk, AIDk, Tu, Ts, Sn> and Q. Thereafter, Sn sends <M2, Q> 
to the GW node over public network. Here, a message authentication code (MAC) [3,33] is computed on 
the message M2 (i.e., Q = MAC_SKgs((Bk||AIDk||Tu||Ts||Sn))) for the integrity verification by the GW 
node. 
(AP-3).  Upon  receiving  the  message  M2  and  Q  from  the  sensor  node,  the  GW  node  performs  
the following actions: 
1.  The GW node validates the time Ts: Check if (Tg−Ts) ≥ ∆T, if yes, then the GW node rejects this 
request and terminates the process, otherwise, it continues with the next step. Here, Tg is the 
current timestamp of the GW node and ∆T is the defined time interval for the transmission delay.  
2.  The GW node computes Q′ on the message M2 using long-term secret key SKgs and verifies  
Q′ = Q, if yes, then the GW node considers that this is an original message and proceeds to the 
next step, otherwise, it rejects the request and terminates further operations. 
3.  The GW node decrypts Bk using secret key x and obtains IDk′ and l′ of Uk. Now, the GW node 
computes h(IDk′), Ak′ = h(IDk′ l′) and Hk′ = h(Ak′). Subsequently, the GW node generates a 
temporary key TkTu (Tu||Hk′). After that, the GW node decrypts the sub-message AIDk by using 
the  TkTu  and  obtains  [h(IDk*)||Sn*||Xg].  Afterwards,  the  GW  node  compares  h(IDk′)  with 
h(IDk*), if this check is successful then the user is a legal user. Here, h(IDk*) is sub-message of 
AIDk. At the same time, the GW node verifies whether Sn is equal to Sn*, which is included in  Sensors 2011, 11                                       
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sub-message of AIDk and if yes, then the GW node considers that Sn is a legal node that user Uk 
wants to access. Otherwise, the GW node rejects the authentication process. 
4.  After authenticating the user and the sensor node; the GW node informs the sensor node that 
user Uk is a legitimate user, therefore, the GW node computes message M3 = <Tg, C> and 
sends message M3 to the sensor node. Here, C = ESKgs[h(IDk)||Xg||Tg] and Tg is the current 
timestamp of the GW node. 
(AP-4). Upon receiving the message M3 from the GW node, the sensor node performs the following: 
1.  Firstly, Sn validate the time Tg: Check if (Ts−Tg) ≥ ∆T, if yes, then the sensor node rejects this 
request and terminates the process. Otherwise, it continues with the next step. Here, Ts is the 
current timestamp of the sensor node and ∆T is the defined time interval for the transmission 
delay.  
2.  Now,  with  the  knowledge  of  SKgs,  the  sensor  node  decrypts  the  sub-message  
C = DSKgs[h(IDk)||Xg||Tg*] and verifies whether Tg is equal to Tg* or not. If Tg is not verified 
then the process is terminated; otherwise, the sensor node considers the GW node a legal node 
and message M3 is generated by the original GW node.  
3.  Thereafter, Sn computes a session key SesK = h(h(IDk)||Xg||Sn||Ts||Tu) for secure communication 
between the sensor node and the user. Now, Sn generates a message M4 = <L, Ts>, and sends it 
to the user Uk. Here, L = ESesK[Xg||Ts] and Ts is the current time stamp of the sensor node. 
(AP-5). While receiving the message M4 from the sensor node, the user Uk performs the following:  
1.  Firstly, Uk validates the time Ts: Check if (Tu − Ts) ≥ ∆T, if yes, then the sensor node rejects 
this request and terminates the process. Otherwise, it continues with the next step. Here, Tu is 
the current timestamp of the user Uk and ∆T is the defined time interval for the transmission 
delay. 
2.  Now, the user Uk computes the session key SesK = h(h(IDk)||Xg||Sn||Ts||Tu) and decrypts the 
sub-message L (i.e., DSesK[Xg*||Ts*]) and obtains Xg* and Ts*. The user Uk checks Xg = Xg* 
and Ts = Ts*, if yes, then he/she believes that Sn is a real sensor node, otherwise not.  
3.  Moreover,  now  the  user  Uk  and  Sn  share  the  symmetric  session  key  
SesK = h(h(IDk)||Xg||Sn||Ts||Tu) for performing further subsequent operation during a session. 
As a result, a legitimate user can communicate with real sensor nodes and access the network data.  
4.4. Password-Update Phase (PUP) 
The password update phase is invoked whenever user Uk wants to update his/her old password 
(PWk). The password update phase is described below: 
(PUP-1). User Uk inserts his/her smart card into the terminal and enters his/her identity (IDk) and 
password (PWk).  
(PUP-2). Firstly, the smart card validates the Uk’s entered IDk and PWk with the stored values by 
computing the following: Vk* = h(IDk||h(rPWk)). Sensors 2011, 11                                       
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(PUP-3). Verify whether Vk* and Vk are equal or not. If not, then reject the password update request; 
otherwise, proceed to the next steps.  
(PUP-4).  Upon  receiving  the  Uk’s  new  password  (PWknew*),  the  smart  card  computes  
Vknew* = h(IDk||h(rPWknew*)) (PUP-5). Now, the smart card replaces Vk with Vknew*.  
After performing the above steps, the password update phase takes place successfully. The flow of 
the password update phase is shown in Figure 4.  
Figure 4. Flow of password update phase. 
Enter IDk and PWk 
  Vk* = h(IDk||h(rPWk)) 
  Check Vk* = Vk, if yes, and then go to the next step. 
  User enter new password PWknew* 
  Vknew*= h(IDk||h(rPWknew*)) 
Replace Vk with Vknew
* in the smart card. 
5. Nonmonotonic Cryptographic Protocol and RUASN Analysis and Verification 
This  section  presents,  first,  the  nonmonotonic  cryptographic  protocol  (NCP)  [24],  and  second, 
formal analysis and verification of RUASN using the NCP protocol. 
5.1. Nonmonotonic Cryptographic Protocol 
This sub-section describes the nonmonotonic cryptographic protocol (NCP), which is also known as 
Rubin  Logic.  The  NCP  logic  assumed  that  involved  entities  are  trusted,  and  state  of  knowledge  
(i.e., current state of the protocol), and describes the authentication logic. In [24-34] the authors state 
that the NCP logic does not require any idealization step in specifying the protocol and is very close  
to real implementation. In Rubin logic the roles are assigned to entities, which are considered as 
independent  processes.  The  nonmonotonic  logic  consists  of  two  sets,  global  set  and  local  set.  
These sets are directly applicable for protocol analysis, as follows. For more details the reader may 
refer to [24] and [35]. 
5.1.1. Global Set and Local Set 
Global set: The global sets are publically known to each principal in a protocol specification, and 
consist of principal set, rule set, secret set and observers set. These sets represent the information of 
the protocol and the contents of these global sets may get updated as the protocol progresses.  
  Principal  set:  This  set  represents  the  involved  entities  in  a  protocol,  such  as,  
Et = {Et1, Et2, Et3,….., Etn}. 
  Rule set: This set contain inference rules for deriving new statements from existing statements, 
as described in Section 5.1.3. Sensors 2011, 11                                       
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  Secret set: This set holds all the protocol secrets, such as S = {S1, S2, S3,…., Sn}, that exist at 
any given time in the system.  
  Observers  set:  This  set  holds  all  Si  such  that  for  each  Si,  Observers  (Si)  contains  all  the 
involved entities who could possibly know the secret Si in the system. 
  Local set: The local sets are not publically known, instead, they are private to each entity. The 
local sets consist of the following: 
  Possession set (Ei): This set holds all the data relevant to security, and that particular entity 
knows or possesses, which includes encryption keys, public keys, and other secrets that are not 
publically available. POSS(Ei) = {poss1, poss2, psos3,…., possn}. 
  Belief  set:  This  set  holds  all  the  beliefs  held  by  a  principal.  For  example,  the  beliefs  
about  freshness,  and  the  beliefs  about  the  possessions  of  other  involved  principals.  
BEL(Ei) = {belf1, belf2, belf3,…., belfn}. 
  Seen set (Ei): This set holds plaintext message parts that Ei sees from messages sent across the 
network and it also contain a copy of the information as the Observers sets. 
  Behavior  list  (Ei):  This  is  a  list  instead  of  a  set,  and  the  list  elements  are  ordered.  
BL = {AL, bev1, bev2, bev3,…, bevn}, here AL is an action list, which consists of zero or many 
actions executed by Ei and bevn is a pair, i.e., (message, AL). The messages have two forms: 
Send (Ei, message) and Receive (Ei, message). Furthermore, after every Send(.) operation, the 
Observers set has to be updated using Update(.) operation. After each Update(.) operation the 
control  pass  to  the next  Receive(.) operation  of principal, which  is  specified  in  the earlier 
Send(.) operation. 
  Haskeys set (Ei): The Haskeys set holds keys that Ei sees either because they are in the initial 
possession set, or they appear in a message sent across the network and are added to Ei’s Seen set.  
5.1.2. Actions 
Actions are operations which play essential roles in the protocol specification. These actions control 
the state of knowledge and possessions for involved entities (such as, constructs messages, hashing, 
concatenation,  encryption  /decryption,  secret  generation,  update,  and  abort  operations,  are  few 
example). For a complete list of actions readers may refer to [24,35]. As per our requirements, we have 
defined the following actions, as shown below, which are directly adopted from [24-34]. The action is 
marked with ▪ to show that it has been successful and moved to the next action. 
  Hash (h(.); X) 
Condition: h(.), X  ∈  POSS(Ei) 
Result: POSS(Ei): = POSS(Ei) ∪ {h(X)} 
Description: This action is for hashing the data. 
  XOR(X1, X2, X3, ….., Xn) 
Condition: X1, X2, X3, ….., Xn ∈ POSS(Ei) 
Result: POSS(Ei): = POSS(Ei) ∈ {X1, X2, X3, ……,Xn} 
Description: This action is for XORing the data. Sensors 2011, 11                                       
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  Encrypt(X, k) 
Condition: X, k ∈ POSS(Ei) 
Result: POSS(Ei) : = POSS(Ei) ∪{{X}k} 
Description: This action occurs when a principal encrypts data. If Ei possesses X and knows k then 
he/she can possess {X}k. 
  Decrypt({X}k, k) 
Condition: {X}k, k ∈ POSS(Ei) 
Result: POSS(Ei):= POSS(Ei) ∪ {X} 
Description: This action is performed when a principal decrypts data. If Ei possesses X, encrypted 
under k, and Ei knows k, then he/she (Ei) can possess X. 
  Generate-Secret(Xg) 
Result: S:= S ∪ {Xg}, Observers(Xg) = {Ei},  
POSS(Ei) := POSS(Ei) ∪ {Xg, Ei},  
BEL(Ei):= BEL (Ei) ∪ #(Xg) 
Description: This action generates a secret for an entity, when needed. Thereafter, a new secret Xg, 
is added to secret S and the Observers and Possession sets are updated. 
  Concat(X1, X2, X3, ….,Xn) 
Condition: X1, X2, X3, …..,Xn ∈ POSS(Ei)  
Result: POSS(Ei) := POSS(Ei) ∪ {X1, X2, X3, …., Xn} 
Description: This action concatenates the sub-messages. 
  Check(X, Y) 
Condition: X, Y ∈ POSS(Ei) 
Result: Valid if X==Y, otherwise invalid. 
  Split(X) 
Condition: X contains X1, X2, X3, ….., Xn, X ∈ POSS(Ei) 
Result: POSS(Ei):= POSS(Ei) ∪ {X1, X2, X3,….,Xn} 
Description: This action is used to break the message into sub-messages. 
  Send(Ej, X) 
Description: This action sends message X to Ej (i.e., Ei to Ej). 
  Receive(Ej, X) 
Description:  This  action  receives  message  X  from  Ej  (i.e.,  Ei  receives  from  Ej)  and  added  to 
POSS(Ei). 
  Update(X) 
Description: The purpose of update action is to update the Observers sets of all secrets that are sent 
on the network. 
  Forget(X) 
Description: The purpose of forget action, when Ei no longer is in possession of X. 
  Abort: Sensors 2011, 11                                       
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Description: The abort action takes place when a checked action could not satisfy the established 
conditions. Furthermore, this action aborts the system, if a protocol run is illegal. As a result, analysis 
reports a failure.  
5.1.3. Inference Rules  
A procedure which combines known facts and produce new fact is called an inference rule [24]. 
These inference rules are used to fact about beliefs during the protocol execution and are applied 
whenever they are relevant to protocol progress. The following inference rules are defined as per our 
requirements, which are directly adopted from [24,35]. 
Notation: 
X contains Y: Y appears as a sub-message of X. 
S: = f(S): S is replaced by the value of f(S). 
X from E: X is received from E. 
1.  Message-meaning rule: 
{X}k from Ej ∈ POSS(Ei),{Ei, Ej}⊆POSS(Ei) 
BEL (Ei): = BEL (Ei) ∪{X ∈ POSS (Ei)} 
2.  Origin rule:   
X∈ POSS(Ei), X contains x1, Ej ∈ Observers(x1) 
                   x1 from Ej ∈ POSS (Ei) 
3.  Sub-message origin rule: 
X∈ POSS (Ei), X contains{x1, x2} from Ej         
               x2  from Ej ∈ POSS(Ei)    
4.  Sub-message freshness rule:  
#(x1) ∈ BEL (Ei), {X contains x1, Y contains x2} ⊆ POSS (Ei) 
                         BEL(Ei): = BEL(Ei) ∪ #(x1) 
For a complete list of inference rules, readers may refer to [24] and [35]. 
5.2. RUASN Analysis and Verification Using Rubin-Logic 
This sub-section presents the analysis and verification of the proposed RUASN using well-known 
Rubin logic [24]. The NCP logic integrates protocol analysis with protocol specification and thus, 
beliefs of involved entities and current state of knowledge is updated as the protocol run progresses. 
For RUASN analysis and verification, only three phases are accounted, namely, registration phase, 
login phase and authentication phase, as follows. 
5.2.1. RUASN Specification 
For  convenience,  a  list  of  some  additional  notations  and  symbols  will  be  used  in  the  RUASN 
analysis and verification, as shown in Table 2.  Sensors 2011, 11                                       
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Table 2. Additional notations. 
Notation  Description 
U, GW and Sn  User, Gateway and Sensor, respectively entities  
X1→X2  X1 replace by X2 
Phase - I  Registration phase 
Phase - II  Login phase 
Phase - III  Authentication phase 
As per the NCP logic, the specifications of RUASN are the following: 
Global sets: It consists of four sets: 
  Principal set: P = U, GW, and Sn. Here, U is the initiator of RUASN. 
  Rule set: Inference rules are defined in Section 5.1.3. 
  Secret set: {PWk, r, x, y, l, SKgs} 
  Observers set: 
Observers (PWk,r): {U} 
Observers(x, y, l): {GW} 
Observers (SKgs): {GW, Sn} 
Local sets: The local sets consist of U, GW, and Sn and are as shown in Table 3. 
Table 3. Local Sets for RUASN.  
 
1.  Entity U 
 
POSS(U) = {PWk,{IDk},r } 
BEL(U) = {#(PWk), #(r)} 
BL(U) = 
 
(1.1) Phase – I 
 
  Hash(h(.); XOR(r, PWk))→Pass 
  Send(GW, {IDk, Pass}) 
  Update({IDk, PWk, r}) 
  Receive (GW, {Ak, Bk, Vk, h(.),Ek, Dk}) 
 
(1.2) Phase – II 
 
  Hash(h(.);Concat(IDk, Pass))→Vk* 
  Check(Vk*, Vk) 
  Hash(h(.); Ak)→Hk 
  Generate-secret(Xg) 
  Concat(Tu, Hk)→TkTu 
  Encrypt({Concat(Hash(h(.);IDk,Sn, Xg))}TkTu)→AIDk 
  Send(Sn,{Bk, AIDk, Tu})→M1 
  Update(IDk, Xg, Sn, Tu) 
 
 
 
(1.3) Phase – III 
 
  Receive(Sn, {L, Ts})→M4 [Here L=ESesK[Xg||Ts]] 
  Split({L, Ts}) 
  Check-freshness (Tu − Ts) ≥ ∆T, if yes, then aborts. 
  Hash(h(.);Concat(Hash(h(.);IDk,Xg,Sn,Ts, Tu)))→SesK 
  Decrypt({L}SesK  and obtain (Xg*, Ts*) 
  Check(Xg, Xg*) 
  Check(Ts, Ts*) 
 
2.  Entity GW 
 
POSS(GW) = {x, y, l, and SKgs } 
BEL(GW) = {#(s), #(y), #(l),#(SKgs)} 
BL(GW) = 
 
(2.1) Phase – I 
 
  Receive(U, {IDk, Pass}) 
  Generate-secret number(l) 
  Hash(h(.); XOR(IDk, l))→Ak 
  Encrypt({Concat(IDk, l)}x)→Bk 
  Hash(h(.);Concat(IDk, Pass))→Vk 
  Send(U, {Ak, Bk, Vk, h(.)}) 
  Update({Ak, Bk, Vk, h(.), Pass}) 
  Forget({Ak,Bk, Vk, Pass}) 
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Table 3. Cont. 
 
(2.2) Phase – II 
          NA 
 
(2.3) Phase – III 
 
  Receive(Sn,{M2, Q})[Here M2 = Bk, AIDk, Tu, Ts, Sn] 
  Split(M2, Q) 
  Split(M2) 
  Check-freshness (Tg − Ts) ≥ ∆T, if yes, then aborts. 
  MAC({Bk, AIDk,Tu, Ts, Sn}SKgs)→Q′ 
  Check(Q, Q′) 
  Decrypt({Bk}x) and obtain [IDk′, l′] 
  Hash(h(.); IDk′) 
  Hash(h(.);XOR(IDk′, l′)) →Ak′ 
  Hash(h(.);Ak′)→Hk′ 
  Concat(Tu, Hk′)→TkTu 
  Decrypt({AIDk}TkTu) and obtain[h(IDk*), Sn*, Xg] 
  Check(h(IDk*), h(IDk′)) 
  Check(Sn*, Sn) 
  Encrypt({Concat(Hash(h(.);IDk), Xg, Tg)}SKgs)→C 
  Send(Sn, {C, Tg})→M3 
  Update(C, Tg) 
 
3.  Entity Sn 
 
POSS(Sn) = { SKgs, Sn } 
BEL(Sn) = {#(SKgs), #(Sn)} 
BL(Sn) = 
 
 
(3.1) Phase – I 
         NA 
 
(3.2) Phase – II 
 
  Receive(U, {M1})          [Here M1= (Bk, AIDk, Tu)] 
  Split(M1) 
  Check-freshness (Ts − Tu) ≥ ∆T, if yes, then aborts. 
  MAC({Concat(Bk,AIDk,Tu,Ts,Sn)}SKgs)→Q 
  Send(GW, {M2, Q})  [Here M2 = (Bk,AIDk, Tu, Ts, Sn)] 
  Update(M2, Q) 
 
(3.3) Phase – III 
 
  Receive(GW,{Tg, C})    
  Split(Tg, C) 
  Check-freshness (Ts − Tg) ≥ ∆T, if yes, then aborts. 
  Decrypt({C}SKgs) and obtain [h(IDk, Xg, Tg*)] 
  Check(Tg*, Tg) 
  Hash(h(.);Concat(Hash(.);IDk, Xg, Sn, Ts, Tu))→SesK 
  Encrypt({Concat(Xg, Ts)}SesK)→L 
  Send(U, {L, Ts})→M4 
  Update(L, Ts) 
 
NA: Not Applicable. 
5.2.2. RUASN Analysis and Verification  
Once the protocol specification has been completed, the analysis begins. This subsection analyzes 
the proposed scheme, which is very close to real implementation. We have considered three phases, 
namely, registration phase, login phase and authentication phase, where three entities are involved in 
the protocol progress [i.e., user(U), gateway(GW) and sensor(Sn)]. 
As we can see the Phase-I in Table 3, the entity U is the initiator of the protocol, so user behavior 
list actions are executed first [i.e., BL(U)]. The first three actions are executed in BL(U) and once the 
Update action is performed, the next actions have to be executed in the GW behavior list, since the 
Send operation (i.e., Send(GW,{IDk,Pass})) is specifies GW list, as shown below: 
  Hash(h(.); XOR(r, PWk))→Pass 
  Send(GW, {IDk, Pass}) 
  Update({IDk, PWk, r}) 
Now GW’s Phase-I actions behavior lists takes place [i.e., BL(GW)] and first seven actions are 
executed in BL(GW). After the Update operation, the next operations have to be executed in the user’s 
behavior list as below, the Send operation [Send(U, {Ak, Bk, Vk, h(.),Ek,Dk})] assigned to U. Then the Sensors 2011, 11                                       
 
 
5037 
Forget operation removes all values (i.e., Ak,Bk,Vk,Ek,Dk) from the local possession set [POSS(GW)], as  
shown below: 
  Receive(U, {IDk, Pass}) 
  Generate-secret number(l) 
  Hash(h(.); XOR(IDk, l))→Ak 
  Encrypt({Concat(IDk, l)}x)→Bk 
  Hash(h(.); Concat(IDk, Pass))→Vk 
  Send(U, {Ak,Bk,Vk, h(.),Ek,Dk}) 
  Update({Ak, Bk, Vk, h(.),Ek,Dk, Pass}) 
  Forget({Ak, Bk, Vk, Ek,Dk, Pass}) 
It is clear that after the end of the user and the gateway Phase-I, there is no significant change in 
their global sets, whereas, in the local sets of both entities (i.e., user and gateway) have are some 
changes, as shown: 
POSS(U) = {IDk, PWk, r{Ak, Bk, Vk, h(.),Ek,Dk}} 
BEL(U) = {#(PWk)} 
POSS(GW) = {x,y,l,SKgs} 
BEL(GW) = {#(x), #(y), #(l), #(SKgs)}  
This is the end of Phase-I. 
Subsequently, Phase-II begins and two entities (i.e., User and Sensor) are involved in this phase.  
As, U is the initiator of the protocol, and thus next operations have to be executed in U’s behavior list 
(BL(U)), as follows:  
  Hash(h(.); Concat(IDk, Pass))→Vk* 
  Check(Vk*, Vk) 
  Hash(h(.); Ak)→Hk 
  Generate-secret(Xg) 
  Concat(Tu, Hk)→TkTu 
  Encrypt({Concat(Hash(h(.);IDk, Sn, Xg))}TkTu)→AIDk 
  Send(Sn,{Bk, AIDk, Tu})→M1 
  Update(IDk, Xg, Sn, Tu) 
After the Update operation, the following changes will takes place in BL(U). 
POSS(U) = {IDk, Vk, Xg, TkTu, AIDk, Ak, Hk} 
BEL(U) = {#(Xg), #(TkTu)} 
The global set of entity U will change with the following: 
Observers(Xg): {U} 
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The next operations have to be executed in Sn’s behavior list [BL(Sn)], because the above Send 
operation  (i.e., Send(Sn,{Bk, AIDk, Tu})→M1) specifies Sn. Upon receiving the  Receive operation  
(i.e., Receive (U,{M1})), Sn does the following: 
  Receive(U, {M1})          [Here M1 = (Bk, AIDk, Tu)] 
  Split(M1) 
  Check-freshness (Ts − Tu) ≥ ∆T, if yes, then aborts. 
  MAC({Concat(Bk, AIDk, Tu, Ts, Sn)}SKgs)→Q 
  Send(GW, {M2, Q}) [Here M2 = (Bk,AIDk, Tu, Ts, Sn)] 
  Update(M2, Q) 
The Update operation makes the following changes in BL(Sn): 
POSS(Sn) = {Bk, AIDk, Tu, Ts, Sn, Q, SKgs} 
BEL(Sn) = {#(SKgs)} 
As we can see the next operations will be executed in GW’s behavior list [BL(GW)], as the above Sn 
Send  operation  (i.e.,  Send(GW,{M2,  Q}))  specifies  to  GW.  Upon  receiving  the  Receive  operation  
[i.e., Receive (Sn,{M2,Q}) ] from Sn. Now, BL(GW) performs the following operations: 
  Receive(Sn, {M2, Q})[Here M2 = Bk, AIDk, Tu, Ts, Sn] 
  Split(M2, Q) 
  Split(M2) 
  Check-freshness (Tg − Ts) ≥ ∆T, if yes, then aborts. 
  MAC({Bk, AIDk, Tu, Ts, Sn}SKgs)→Q′ 
  Check(Q, Q′) 
  Decrypt({Bk}x)  and obtain [IDk′, l′] 
  Hash(h(.);IDk′) 
  Hash(h(.); XOR(IDk′, l′)) →Ak′ 
  Hash(h(.);Ak′)→Hk′ 
  Concat(Tu, Hk′)→TkTu 
  Decrypt({AIDk}TkTu) and obtain[h(IDk*), Sn*, Xg] 
  Check(h(IDk*), h(IDk′)) 
  Check(Sn*, Sn) 
  Encrypt({Concat(Hash(h(.); IDk), Xg, Tg)}SKgs)→C 
  Send(Sn, { Tg, C })→M3 
  Update( Tg, C) 
After applying Update operation the following changes take place in the gateway entity: 
POSS(GW) = {IDk, Hk, Xg, SKgs, Sn, l, x, y, 
{Bk, AIDk, Tu, Ts, Sn}  and {MAC{Bk, AIDk, Tu, Ts, Sn}Skgs}from Sn} 
BEL(GW) = {#(SKgs),#(x), #(y), #(l),#(Tg)} 
 
Subsequently, the global set of entity GW will change with the following: Sensors 2011, 11                                       
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Observers(Xg): {U, GW} 
The  next  operations  have  to  be  executed  in  Phase-III  of  BL(Sn),  because  the  above  Send 
operation  [i.e.,  Send(Sn,  {Tg,  C})]  specifies  Sn  and  upon  receiving  the  Receive  operation  
[i.e., Receive(GW,{Tg, C})] Sn will do the following: 
  Receive(GW, {Tg, C}). 
  Split(Tg, C). 
  Check-freshness (Ts − Tg) ≥ ∆T, if yes, then aborts. 
  Decrypt({C}SKgs) and obtain [h(IDk, Xg, Tg*)]. 
  Check(Tg*, Tg). 
  Hash(h(.); Concat(Hash(.); IDk, Xg, Sn, Ts, Tu))→SesK. 
  Encrypt({Concat(Xg, Ts)}SesK)→L. 
  Send(U, {L, Ts})→M4. 
  Update(L, Ts). 
After applying the Update operation on the received message, the following changes will occur in  
the Sn entity: 
POSS(Sn) = { SKgs, SesK, Ts{IDk, Xg, Tg}SKgs from GW} 
BEL(Sn) = {#(SKgs), #(SesK), #(Xg), #(Ts)} 
The following changes will occur in the global set of the entity Sn: 
Observers(Xg): {U, GW, Sn} 
Observers(SesK): {Sn} 
Thereafter, the next operations have to be executed in Phase-III of BL(U). Since the above Send 
operation [i.e., Send(U, {L, Ts})] specifies U entity and BL(U) perform the following actions: 
  Receive(Sn, {L, Ts})→M4 [Here L=ESesK[Xg||Ts]] 
  Split({L, Ts}) 
  Check-freshness (Tu − Ts) ≥ ∆T, if yes, then aborts. 
  Hash(h(.); Concat(Hash(h(.); IDk, Xg, Sn, Ts, Tu)))→SesK 
  Decrypt({L}SesK) and obtain (Xg*, Ts*) 
  Check(Xg, Xg*) 
  Check(Ts, Ts*) 
In the Check operation U’s verify Xg, which was generated by him/her and verify time-stamp Ts. If 
the Check operations are successful then the following changes will occur in BL(U):  
Local set: 
POSS(U) = {Xg, Sn, SesK} 
BEL(U) = {#(Xg), #(SesK)} 
Now finally the global set contains: Sensors 2011, 11                                       
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Observers(Xg): {U, GW, Sn} 
Observers(SesK): {U, Sn} 
The application of Rubin logic in our framework is illustrated above, which closely resembles the 
structure of real user authentication system in wireless sensor network. Our specifications are designed 
to resemble actual implementation as much as possible. 
6. Evaluation of RUASN 
In this section, we present our proposed RUASN evaluation in terms of security analysis (i.e., can it 
resist  against  several  well-known  attacks),  and  efficiency  analysis  in  terms  of  computational  and 
communication cost. Finally, we show a functionality comparison with existing schemes. 
Before evaluating the RUASN, it is assumed that an adversary may have full control over the 
network with following capabilities: 
  An adversary may intercept all the messages (i.e., M1, M2, M3 and M4) at any time. 
  He/she may intercept, delete or modify, and insert any message over the public network. 
  In addition, we assume that an adversary may hack either passwords or steal user Uk’s smart 
card, extract secrets [36,37], but cannot do both at the same time [38].  
  As per the current literature, extracting secrets from the smart card memory is quite difficult 
and some smart card manufacturer companies provide countermeasures against risk of side 
channel  attacks  [18,36].  Furthermore,  [39]  has  proposed  countermeasures  against  power  
analysis attacks.  
Based  on  above  assumptions,  an  attacker  may  execute  certain  attacks  to  breach  the  proposed 
RUASN scheme. 
6.1. Security Analysis 
In this subsection, we analyze the security of proposed RUASN and further compare with the M.L,  
Das [18], He et al. [21], Wong et al. [10], and Vaidya et al. [14] schemes. We prove that the presented 
scheme  can  resist  certain  popular  attacks  that  are  found  in  the  existing  wireless  sensor  network 
literature. 
Mutual  Authentication.  Our  scheme  provides  mutual  authentication,  where  all  entities  
(i.e., user, gateway and sensor node) are mutually authenticating each other. More specifically, when 
the GW node receives the message M2 (i.e., <Bk, AIDk, Tu, Ts, Sn>) and Q, it can make sure that the 
user message M1 (i.e., <Bk, AIDk, Tu>) is included in the sensor node message M2. When the sensor 
node receives message M3 (i.e., <Tg, C>), it ensures that this message is generated by the GW node. 
Furthermore, when the user receives message M4 (i.e., <L, Ts>), he/she can also confirm that this 
message is generated by the sensor node. Hence, mutual authentication is achieved. 
User  anonymity.  In  our  scheme,  user  anonymity  Uk  is  preserved  at  the  registration  phase  by 
computing Ak = h(IDk l) and Bk = Ex[IDk||l]. In addition, it is impossible to extract IDk from the AIDk, 
which is ETkTu[h(IDk)||Sn||Xg], and it is also very difficult to revert the h(IDk). So, our scheme can 
preserve user anonymity. Sensors 2011, 11                                       
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Session Key Establishment. The proposed scheme provides session key establishment after the 
authentication phase. A session key [i.e., SesK = h(h(IDk)||Xg||Sn||Ts||Tu)] is set up between the user 
and the sensor node for secure subsequent communication. The SesK will be different for each login 
session and cannot be replayed after the time expires. More importantly, the user and the sensor node 
can securely execute encryptions and decryptions by using of SesK and hence, achieve confidentiality 
for the subsequent messages.  
Confidentiality. Our proposed scheme provides adequate confidentiality to their messages (such as, 
ETkTu[h(IDk)||Sn||Xg],  ESKgs[h(IDk)||Xg||Tg]  and  ESesK[Xg||Ts]).  More  precisely,  these  messages  are 
confidential from any attacker. 
Replay Attacks. Our scheme is resistant to replay attacks [42], because the authenticity of messages 
<M1>,  <M2>,  <M3>  and  <M4>  are  validated  by  checking  the  freshness  of  four  timestamps  
((Ts  −  Tu)  ≥  ∆T,  (Tg  −  Ts)  ≥  ∆T,  (Ts  −  Tg)  ≥  ∆T  and  (Tu  −  Ts)  ≥  ∆T).  Let’s  assume  an  
intruder intercepts a login request message M1 and attempt to access the sensor node by replaying the 
same message (M1). The verification of this login attempt fails, since the time difference expires  
(i.e., (Ts − Tu) ≥ ∆T). Similarly, if an intruder intercepts a valid message M2 (i.e., <Bk, AIDk, Tu, Ts, 
Sn>) and attempts to replay it to the GW node, the verification request will fail at the  GW node 
because of the time difference expires again (i.e., (Tg − Ts) ≥ ∆T). Thus, our framework is secure 
against replaying of messages. 
User Impersonation Attacks. An attacker cannot impersonate the user. Suppose an attacker forges a 
login message <Bk, AIDk, Tu>. Now, he/she will again try to login into the system with the modified 
message <Bk*, AIDk*, Tu>, since, the fake AIDk* will not be verified at the GW node, and the GW 
node cannot get the original sub-message {h(IDk*)||Sn*} by decrypting AIDk*. Therefore, it is not 
possible to impersonate the user. 
Gateway  Impersonation  Attacks.  As long as an attacker does not possess the secret key  SKgs, 
he/she cannot impersonate the server and cannot cheat the sensor node. Hence, it frustrates attackers to 
generate the valid message M4 to the sensor node.  
Insider Attacks. It is possible in a real-time environment, when the gateway manager or system 
administrator can use the user password PWk (e.g., weak password) to impersonate the user Uk through 
any other network gateways [20,21,40]. In this case, our scheme does not give any room for privileged 
insiders, since, in the registration phase, the user Uk is passing h(rPWk) instead of the plain password. 
Thus, the insider of the GW node cannot get PWk easily [20,21]. Here, r is a sufficiently high entropy 
number, which is not revealed to the GW node. Furthermore, the proposed scheme does not store any 
verifier table and can resist the insider attacks [41]. 
Stolen-Verifier Attacks. The stolen-verifier attack scenario is not applicable to our scheme, as we 
are not using any password/verifier table.  
Offline-Password  Guessing  Attacks.  Our  scheme  is  free  from  any  password  verifier  table,  so 
password guessing attacks are not feasible. In the login phase, passwords are not simply transmitted, 
instead, they are transmitted with some other secret (i.e., Vk = h(IDk|| h(rPWk))), which makes it 
difficult to guess the user’s password. 
Man-in-the-Middle  Attacks.  An  attacker  may  attempt  a  man-in-the-middle  (MIMT)  attack  by 
modifying  the  login  message  <Bk,  AIDk,  Tu>  into  <Bk*,  AIDk*,  Tu*>.  However,  this  malicious Sensors 2011, 11                                       
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attempt will not work, as the false AIDk* will not be verified at the GW node and the GW node cannot 
get the original sub-message {h(IDk*)||Sn*} by decrypting AIDk*. Thus, man-in-the-middle attacks are 
not applicable to the RUASN scheme. 
Secure Password Update. In the secure password update phase, our framework first verifies the old 
IDk, PWk and only then requests a new password. Otherwise, it rejects all password update requests. 
Therefore, our framework updates passwords securely.  
Gateway Secret Key Guessing Attacks. In our scheme, the gateway secret keys (x and y) are very 
long and possess high entropy. In addition, neither x nor y are transmitted in plain text over the public 
channel, instead x and y are mainly used as a key to encrypt data (Ex[IDk||l], SKgs = h(Sn||y)). Hence, 
it is very difficult to guess both the gateway master keys, x and y. 
6.2. Efficiency Analysis 
In this subsection, we present an efficiency analysis (i.e., computational cost and communication 
cost) of our scheme and compare it with existing schemes (Das [18], He et al. [21], Wong et al. [10] 
and Vaidya et al. [14]) for wireless sensor networks. The evaluation parameters are shown below: 
H: performing one-way hash function. 
S: symmetric cryptosystem. 
MAC: the time for performing a MAC. 
Computation  Cost:  RUASN  adopts  low-cost  computations  like  a  one-way  hash  function  and 
symmetric  cryptosystem, which  is  acceptable  for WSNs and  provides  more security features  with 
reasonable computational costs. As we can see the computation cost comparisons of our scheme and 
other  related  scheme  are  summarized  in  Table  4.  It  is  easy  to  see  that,  in  the  registration  phase  
(i.e., one-time job) our scheme requires 4H and one symmetric cryptosystem, whereas in [21] and [14] 
6H and 4H are required, respectively. Furthermore, in the login and authentication phase the proposed 
scheme requires 9H, 6S and 2MAC, whereas, [18,21] and [14] require 9H, 11H and 9H, respectively. 
This is due to fact that in order to provide more functionality such as mutual authentication, user 
anonymity, message confidentiality, and secure session key establishment, more computational costs 
are incurred. 
Table 4. A performance comparison of RUASN with the existing schemes. 
Schemes 
Registration  Login and Authentication 
User  Gateway  User  Gateway  Sensor node 
Das [18]  -  3H  4H  4H  1H 
Daojing et al. [21]  1H  5H  5H  5H  1H 
Wong et al. [10]  -  3H  -  1H  3H 
Vaidya et al. [14]  2H  2H  3H  3H  3H 
Proposed RUASN  1H  3H + 1S  4H + 2S  4H + 2S + 1MAC  1H + 2S + 1MAC 
 
Communication Cost: It is easy to visualize from Figure 3 that RUASN requires four message 
exchanges  for  the  whole  communication  and  confirmation  of  all  entities  (i.e.,  user,  gateway  and 
sensor), which is practical for real-time applications.  Sensors 2011, 11                                       
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6.3. Functionality Analysis 
From Table 5, it is easy to see that the RUASN has more security functionality as compared to other 
existing  proposed  protocols  for  WSNs.  Our  scheme  has  robust  security  features  such  as  mutual 
authentication between all entities (i.e., user, gateway and sensor), user anonymity, confidentiality, 
secure session key establishment, secure password update phase and secure against insider attacks, and 
it meets all the requirements of Liao et al. [27], which are discussed in Section 3. 
Table 5. Functionality comparison of RUASN with existing schemes. 
Security Features 
Das 
[18] 
He et al. 
[21] 
Wong et al. 
[10] 
Vaidya et al. 
[14] 
Proposed 
RUASN 
Provides mutual authentication  No  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Provide user privacy  No  Yes  No  Yes  Yes 
Confidentiality  No  No  No  No  Yes 
Secure Session key agreement  No  No  No  No  Yes 
Secure password update phase  No  Yes  No  Yes  Yes 
Replay attack  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
No password tables stored inside  
the gateway 
Yes  Yes  No  No  Yes 
No verification table stored inside  
the gateway 
Yes  Yes  No  No  Yes 
Password is not be transmitted as 
plaintext 
No  Yes  No  Yes  Yes 
Resist insider-attacks  No  Yes  No  Yes  Yes 
Password is not exposed to the  
gateway administrator 
No  Yes  No  No  Yes 
Secure against gateway secret key 
guessing attack 
No  No  No  No  Yes 
Secure against password guessing 
attack 
No  Yes  No  Yes  Yes 
As we have seen in the above analysis, it is clear that the RUASN is a robust user authentication 
protocol and provides more security services at less cost.  
 
7. Conclusions  
In real-time, as the sensor networks themselves offer services to users; it is necessary to control 
who is accessing the information and if it he/she allowed to do so. Therefore, access control is an Sensors 2011, 11                                       
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imperative  requirement for  wireless  sensor  networks to  protect the data  access from unauthorized 
parties. 
In  this  regard,  we  have  proposed  a  robust  user  authentication  framework  for  wireless  sensor 
networks,  RUASN,  which  is  based  on  a  two-factor  approach  (i.e.,  password  and  smart  card)  by 
exploiting  the  advantages  of  cryptographic  hash  functions  and  cryptosystems.  We  have  shown  a 
security analysis and performance analysis of the RUASN framework and compared it with recent 
existing schemes. Through analysis, we show that our scheme is more robust against many popular 
attacks, which are prominent risks for wireless sensor network and that it provides many security 
services (i.e., mutual authentication, user anonymity, confidentiality, secure session key and allow 
users to choose/updates their password ) at reasonable computational costs. 
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